olade
2018-12-15 19:38:56 UTC
In reality, the US should have sent warships to the sea of Azoz to
demonstrate its freedom to travel anywhere it wants. But, at the moment, the
sea of Azoz is closed by Russia, which is not legal to do so.
But at issue is psychological game working at each other can be negotiated.
There are many other fronts that US are addressing its strategic approaches,
such a South China Sea and other key issues of places such as North Korea,
Syria, and Venezuela.
The US is still a formidable force but there is not enough of coalition
forces to assist them. A collective coalition quality force is stronger than
a sole quality force. Russia is testing the patience of the US, and the US
response is delayed by talking more, instead.
author's view, is Americans' failure to appreciate Sunzi's opening
sentence： 兵者,国之大事,死生之地,存亡之道，不可不察也 because the US has yet to defend the US
nation from foreign invasion/occupation.
To the extent that military operations and a country's life and death do not
intersect, military operations degenerate into military-sport games. And US
punditry further trivialize military operations exemplified by Stephen Blank
Sea of Azov article:
"In practice this means that Washington should send US Navy warships into
the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait to demonstrate our commitment to
Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity and the freedom of navigation on the
seas, which has been a cornerstone of US foreign policy since 1789."
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-trump-can-get-putin-s-attention
demonstrate its freedom to travel anywhere it wants. But, at the moment, the
sea of Azoz is closed by Russia, which is not legal to do so.
But at issue is psychological game working at each other can be negotiated.
There are many other fronts that US are addressing its strategic approaches,
such a South China Sea and other key issues of places such as North Korea,
Syria, and Venezuela.
The US is still a formidable force but there is not enough of coalition
forces to assist them. A collective coalition quality force is stronger than
a sole quality force. Russia is testing the patience of the US, and the US
response is delayed by talking more, instead.
That is well said and well analysed piece by the author.
Indeed, many generals in the Pentagon never served a single day in
uniform
and many do not possess even basic knowledge of physical principles of
which
modern weapons to use and which to operate.
This is because they do not know the changing dimensions that have
reflected
by the changing tactical, operational and strategic aspects if war. Even
between distance-contact war and close-contact war or invasion war can
make
war dimensions to change and churn and escalate up very fast, sometimes
even
in "a blink of an eye".
General should not sit in their air-conditioned Pentagon office. They
should
be on the ground to work with the troops on practical and hand-on
aspects of
training with fast changing scenarios of war game plans.
But this is just the symptom. The root cause, if I am to summarize theIndeed, many generals in the Pentagon never served a single day in
uniform
and many do not possess even basic knowledge of physical principles of
which
modern weapons to use and which to operate.
This is because they do not know the changing dimensions that have
reflected
by the changing tactical, operational and strategic aspects if war. Even
between distance-contact war and close-contact war or invasion war can
make
war dimensions to change and churn and escalate up very fast, sometimes
even
in "a blink of an eye".
General should not sit in their air-conditioned Pentagon office. They
should
be on the ground to work with the troops on practical and hand-on
aspects of
training with fast changing scenarios of war game plans.
author's view, is Americans' failure to appreciate Sunzi's opening
sentence： 兵者,国之大事,死生之地,存亡之道，不可不察也 because the US has yet to defend the US
nation from foreign invasion/occupation.
intersect, military operations degenerate into military-sport games. And US
punditry further trivialize military operations exemplified by Stephen Blank
Sea of Azov article:
"In practice this means that Washington should send US Navy warships into
the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait to demonstrate our commitment to
Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity and the freedom of navigation on the
seas, which has been a cornerstone of US foreign policy since 1789."
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-trump-can-get-putin-s-attention
Andrei Martyanov, the author of LOSING MILITARY SUPREMACY, argues that
"American military history is as much a matter of PR spin as it is a
matter
of reality.
All nations, without exception, tend to have their own military
mythologies
and this is normal as long as those mythologies have at least some basis
in
reality. Military historians may argue about the validity of claims
about
the massive armor clash at Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943 during the
Battle of
Kursk, but no serious military historian doubts the battle itself, its
gigantic scope and scale, and the massive influence it had not only for
the
war on the Eastern front but on the outcome of World War Two. How can
one
even claim any success militarily for the United States in the last 70
years
when, with the exception of a turkey shoot in the First Gulf War, the
United
States as a nation and its much-vaunted military didn’t win a single
war?
The latest massive geostrategic failure in Syria only underscores the
sad
state of American fighting doctrine and of its war technology. As
Geoffrey
Aronson’s title to his article on Syria states: “Washington Relegated to
Bystander Status in Syria Talks. Yet it is still attempting to
manipulate,
and will lose at that, too.”13 Manipulation and PR are no substitute for
actual victory which is defined universally as achieving the political
objectives of the war, or in Clausewitz’s one liner—the ability to
compel
the enemy to do our will. The United States military’s balance sheet on
that
is simply not impressive, despite a mammoth military budget, immensely
expensive weapons and a massive, well-oiled PR machine. All this is the
result of the US military-industrial complex long ago becoming a jobs
program for retired Pentagon generals and an embodiment of the
neoconservative “view” on war—a view developed by people, most of whom
never
served a single day in uniform and do not possess even basic fundamental
knowledge of the physical principles on which modern weapons operate and
how
technological dimensions reflect upon tactical, operational and
strategic
aspects of war (they are all tightly interconnected and do not exist
separately)."
"American military history is as much a matter of PR spin as it is a
matter
of reality.
All nations, without exception, tend to have their own military
mythologies
and this is normal as long as those mythologies have at least some basis
in
reality. Military historians may argue about the validity of claims
about
the massive armor clash at Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943 during the
Battle of
Kursk, but no serious military historian doubts the battle itself, its
gigantic scope and scale, and the massive influence it had not only for
the
war on the Eastern front but on the outcome of World War Two. How can
one
even claim any success militarily for the United States in the last 70
years
when, with the exception of a turkey shoot in the First Gulf War, the
United
States as a nation and its much-vaunted military didn’t win a single
war?
The latest massive geostrategic failure in Syria only underscores the
sad
state of American fighting doctrine and of its war technology. As
Geoffrey
Aronson’s title to his article on Syria states: “Washington Relegated to
Bystander Status in Syria Talks. Yet it is still attempting to
manipulate,
and will lose at that, too.”13 Manipulation and PR are no substitute for
actual victory which is defined universally as achieving the political
objectives of the war, or in Clausewitz’s one liner—the ability to
compel
the enemy to do our will. The United States military’s balance sheet on
that
is simply not impressive, despite a mammoth military budget, immensely
expensive weapons and a massive, well-oiled PR machine. All this is the
result of the US military-industrial complex long ago becoming a jobs
program for retired Pentagon generals and an embodiment of the
neoconservative “view” on war—a view developed by people, most of whom
never
served a single day in uniform and do not possess even basic fundamental
knowledge of the physical principles on which modern weapons operate and
how
technological dimensions reflect upon tactical, operational and
strategic
aspects of war (they are all tightly interconnected and do not exist
separately)."