Adrian Dharma Wijaya (Adri)
2008-06-20 12:00:39 UTC
Leaked U.S. Military Manual
How to Train Death Squads and Quash Revolutions from San Salvador to
Iraq
From Wikileaks
How to covertly train paramilitaries, censor the press, ban unions,
employ terrorists, conduct warrantless searches, suspend habeas corpus,
conceal breaches of the Geneva Convention and make the population love it
JULIAN ASSANGE (investigative editor)
Monday June 15, 2008
Wikileaks has released a sensitive 219 page US military
counterinsurgency manual. The manual, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics
Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces (1994, 2004), may be critically
described as "what we learned about running death squads and propping up
corrupt government in Latin America and how to apply it to other places".
Its contents are both history defining for Latin America and, given the
continued role of US Special Forces in the suppression of insurgencies,
including in Iraq and Afghanistan, history making.
The leaked manual, which has been verified with military sources, is
the official US Special Forces doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense or FID.
FID operations are designed to prop up a "friendly" government facing
a popular revolution or guerilla insurgency. FID interventions are often
covert or quasi-covert due to the unpopular nature of the governments being
supported ("In formulating a realistic policy for the use of advisors, the
commander must carefully gauge the psychological climate of the HN [Host
Nation] and the United States.")
The manual directly advocates training paramilitaries, pervasive
surveillance, censorship, press control and restrictions on labor unions &
political parties. It directly advocates warrantless searches, detainment
without charge and (under varying circumstances) the suspension of habeas
corpus. It directly advocates employing terrorists or prosecuting
individuals for terrorism who are not terrorists, running false flag
operations and concealing human rights abuses from journalists. And it
repeatedly advocates the use of subterfuge and "psychological operations"
(propaganda) to make these and other "population & resource control"
measures more palatable.
The content has been particularly informed by the long United States
involvement in El Salvador.
In 2005 a number of credible media reports suggested the Pentagon was
intensely debating "the Salvador option" for Iraq.[1]. According to the New
York Times Magazine:
The template for Iraq today is not Vietnam, with which it has often
been compared, but El Salvador, where a right-wing government backed by the
United States fought a leftist insurgency in a 12-year war beginning in
1980. The cost was high ― more than 70,000 people were killed, most
of them civilians, in a country with a population of just six million. Most
of the killing and torturing was done by the army and the right-wing death
squads affiliated with it. According to an Amnesty International report in
2001, violations committed by the army and associated groups included
‘‘extrajudicial executions, other unlawful killings,
‘disappearances’ and torture. . . . Whole villages were
targeted by the armed forces and their inhabitants massacred.’’ As
part of President Reagan’s policy of supporting anti-Communist
forces, hundreds of millions of dollars in United States aid was funneled to
the Salvadoran Army, and a team of 55 Special Forces advisers, led for
several years by Jim Steele, trained front-line battalions that were accused
of significant human rights abuses.
The same article states James Steele and many other former Central
American Special Forces "military advisors" have now been appointed at a
high level to Iraq.
In 1993 a United Nations truth commission on El Salvador, which
examined 22,000 atrocities that occurred during the twelve-year civil war,
attributed 85 percent of the abuses to the US-backed El Salvador military
and its paramilitary death squads.
It is worth noting what the US Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert E.
White (now the president for the Center for International Policy) had to say
as early as 1980, in State Department documents obtained under the Freedom
of Information Act:
The major, immediate threat to the existence of this government is the
right-wing violence. In the city of San Salvador, the hired thugs of the
extreme right, some of them well-trained Cuban and Nicaraguan terrorists,
kill moderate left leaders and blow up government buildings. In the
countryside, elements of the security forces torture and kill the
campesinos, shoot up their houses and burn their crops. At least two hundred
refugees from the countryside arrive daily in the capital city. This
campaign of terror is radicalizing the rural areas just as surely as
Somoza's National Guard did in Nicaragua. Unfortunately, the command
structure of the army and the security forces either tolerates or encourages
this activity. These senior officers believe or pretend to believe that they
are eliminating the guerillas.[2]
Selected extracts follow. Note that the manual is 219 pages long and
contains substantial material throughout. These extracts should merely be
considered representative. Emphasis has been added for further selectivity.
The full manual can be found at US Special Forces counter-insurgency manual
FM 31-20-3.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government
agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 5 December 2003.
Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United
States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN:
AOJK-DTD-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure
of contents or reconstruction of the document.
[...]
Counterintelligence
[...]
Most of the counterintelligence measures used will be overt in nature
and aimed at protecting installations, units, and information and detecting
espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Examples of counterintelligence
measures to use are
a.. Background investigations and records checks of persons in
sensitive positions and persons whose loyalty may be questionable.
b.. Maintenance of files on organizations, locations, and
individuals of counterintelligence interest.
c.. Internal security inspections of installations and units.
d.. Control of civilian movement within government-controll ed
areas.
e.. Identification systems to minimize the chance of insurgents
gaining access to installations or moving freely.
f.. Unannounced searches and raids on suspected meeting places.
g.. Censorship.
[...]
PSYOP [Psychological Operations] are essential to the success of PRC
[Population & Resources Control]. For maximum effectiveness, a strong
psychological operations effort is directed toward the families of the
insurgents and their popular support base. The PSYOP aspect of the PRC
program tries to make the imposition of control more palatable to the people
by relating the necessity of controls to their safety and well-being. PSYOP
efforts also try to create a favorable national or local government image
and counter the effects of the insurgent propaganda effort.
Control Measures
SF [US Special Forces] can advise and assist HN [Host Nation] forces
in developing and implementing control measures. Among these measures are
the following:
a.. Security Forces. Police and other security forces use PRC
[Population & Resources Control] measures to deprive the insurgent of
support and to identify and locate members of his infrastructure.
Appropriate PSYOP [Psychological Operations] help make these measures more
acceptable to the population by explaining their need. The government
informs the population that the PRC measures may cause an inconvenience but
are necessary due to the actions of the insurgents.
b.. Restrictions. Rights on the legality of detention or
imprisonment of personnel (for example, habeas corpus) may be temporarily
suspended. This measure must be taken as a last resort, since it may provide
the insurgents with an effective propaganda theme. PRC [Population &
Resources Control] measures can also include curfews or blackouts, travel
restrictions, and restricted residential areas such as protected villages or
resettlement areas. Registration and pass systems and control of sensitive
items (resources control) and critical supplies such as weapons, food, and
fuel are other PRC measures. Checkpoints, searches, roadblocks;
surveillance, censorship, and press control; and restriction of activity
that applies to selected groups (labor unions, political groups and the
like) are further PRC measures.
[...]
Legal Considerations. All restrictions, controls, and DA measures must
be governed by the legality of these methods and their impact on the
populace. In countries where government authorities do not have wide
latitude in controlling the population, special or emergency legislation
must be enacted. This emergency legislation may include a form of martial
law permitting government forces to search without warrant, to detain
without bringing formal charges, and to execute other similar actions.
[...]
Psychological Operations
PSYOP can support the mission by discrediting the insurgent forces to
neutral groups, creating dissension among the insurgents themselves, and
supporting defector programs. Divisive programs create dissension,
disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within the insurgent
forces. Also important are national programs to win insurgents over to the
government side with offers of amnesty and rewards. Motives for surrendering
can range from personal rivalries and bitterness to disillusionment and
discouragement. Pressure from the security forces has persuasive power.
[...]
Intelligence personnel must consider the parameters within which a
revolutionary movement operates. Frequently, they establish a centralized
intelligence processing center to collect and coordinate the amount of
information required to make long-range intelligence estimates. Long-range
intelligence focuses on the stable factors existing in an insurgency. For
example, various demographic factors (ethnic, racial, social, economic,
religious, and political characteristics of the area in which the
underground movement takes places) are useful in identifying the members of
the underground. Information about the underground organization at national,
district, and local level is basic in FID [Foreign Internal Defense] and/or
IDAD operations. Collection of specific short-range intelligence about the
rapidly changing variables of a local situation is critical. Intelligence
personnel must gather information on members of the underground, their
movements, and their methods. Biographies and photos of suspected
underground members, detailed information on their homes, families,
education, work history, and associates are important features of
short-range intelligence.
Destroying its tactical units is not enough to defeat the enemy. The
insurgent's underground cells or infrastructure must be neutralized first
because the infrastructure is his main source of tactical intelligence and
political control. Eliminating the infrastructure within an area achieves
two goals: it ensures the government's control of the area, and it cuts off
the enemy's main source of intelligence. An intelligence and operations
command center (IOCC) is needed at district or province level. This
organization becomes the nerve center for operations against the insurgent
infrastructure. Information on insurgent infrastructure targets should come
from such sources as the national police and other established intelligence
nets and agents and individuals (informants) .
The highly specialized and sensitive nature of clandestine
intelligence collection demands specially selected and highly trained
agents. Information from clandestine sources is often highly sensitive and
requires tight control to protect the source. However, tactical information
upon which a combat response can be taken should be passed to the
appropriate tactical level.
The spotting, assessment, and recruitment of an agent is not a
haphazard process regardless of the type agent being sought. During the
assessment phase, the case officer determines the individual's degree of
intelligence, access to target, available or necessary cover, and
motivation. He initiates the recruitment and coding action only after he
determines the individual has the necessary attributes to fulfill the needs.
All agents are closely observed and those that are not reliable are
relieved. A few well-targeted, reliable agents are better and more
economical than a large number of poor ones.
A system is needed to evaluate the agents and the information they
submit. The maintenance of an agent master dossier (possibly at the SFOD B
level) can be useful in evaluating the agent on the value and quality of
information he has submitted. The dossier must contain a copy of the agent's
source data report and every intelligence report he submitted.
Security forces can induce individuals among the general populace to
become informants. Security forces use various motives (civic-mindedness,
patriotism, fear, punishment avoidance, gratitude, revenge or jealousy,
financial rewards) as persuasive arguments. They use the assurance of
protection from reprisal as a major inducement. Security forces must
maintain the informant's anonymity and must conceal the transfer of
information from the source to the security agent. The security agent and
the informant may prearrange signals to coincide with everyday behavior.
Surveillance, the covert observation of persons and places, is a
principal method of gaining and confirming intelligence information.
Surveillance techniques naturally vary with the requirements of different
situations. The basic procedures include mechanical observation (wiretaps or
concealed microphones) , observation from fixed locations, and physical
surveillance of subjects.
Whenever a suspect is apprehended during an operation, a hasty
interrogation takes place to gain immediate information that could be of
tactical value. The most frequently used methods for gathering information
(map studies and aerial observation) , however, are normally unsuccessful.
Most PWs cannot read a map. When they are taken on a visual reconnaissance
flight, it is usually their first flight and they cannot associate an aerial
view with what they saw on the ground.
The most successful interrogation method consists of a map study based
on terrain information received from the detainee. The interrogator first
asks the detainee what the sun's direction was when he left the base camp.
From this information, he can determine a general direction. The
interrogator then asks the detainee how long it took him to walk to the
point where he was captured. Judging the terrain and the detainee's health,
the interrogator can determine a general radius in which the base camp can
be found (he can use an overlay for this purpose). He then asks the detainee
to identify significant terrain features he saw on each day of his journey,
(rivers, open areas, hills, rice paddies, swamps). As the detainee speaks
and his memory is jogged, the interrogator finds these terrain features on a
current map and gradually plots the detainee's route to finally locate the
base camp.
If the interrogator is unable to speak the detainee's language, he
interrogates through an interpreter who received a briefing beforehand. A
recorder may also assist him. If the interrogator is not familiar with the
area, personnel who are familiar with the area brief him before the
interrogation and then join the interrogation team. The recorder allows the
interrogator a more free-flowing interrogation. The recorder also lets a
knowledgeable interpreter elaborate on points the detainee has mentioned
without the interrogator interrupting the continuity established during a
given sequence. The interpreter can also question certain inaccuracies,
keeping pressure on the subject. The interpreter and the interrogator have
to be well trained to work as a team. The interpreter has to be familiar
with the interrogation procedures. His preinterrogation briefings must
include information on the detainee's health, the circumstances resulting in
his detention, and the specific information required. A successful
interrogation is contingent upon continuity and a welltrained interpreter. A
tape recorder (or a recorder taking notes) enhances continuity by freeing
the interrogator from time-consuming administrative tasks.
[...]
Political Structures. A tightly disciplined party organization,
formally structured to parallel the existing government hierarchy, may be
found at the center of some insurgent movements. In most instances, this
organizational structure will consist of committed organizations at the
village, district province, and national levels. Within major divisions and
sections of an insurgent military headquarters, totally distinct but
parallel command channels exist. There are military chains of command and
political channels of control. The party ensures complete domination over
the military structure using its own parallel organization. It dominates
through a political division in an insurgent military headquarters, a party
cell or group in an insurgent military unit, or a political military
officer.
[...]
Special Intelligence- Gathering Operations
Alternative intelligence- gathering techniques and sources, such as
doppelganger or pseudo operations, can be tried and used when it is hard to
obtain information from the civilian populace. These pseudo units are
usually made up of ex-guerrilla and/or security force personnel posing as
insurgents. They circulate among the civilian populace and, in some cases,
infiltrate guerrilla units to gather information on guerrilla movements and
its support infrastructure.
Much time and effort must be used to persuade insurgents to switch
allegiance and serve with the security forces. Prospective candidates must
be properly screened and then given a choice of serving with the HN [Host
Nation] security forces or facing prosecution under HN law for terrorist
crimes.
Government security force units and teams of varying size have been
used in infiltration operations against underground and guerrilla forces.
They have been especially effective in getting information on underground
security and communications systems, the nature and extent of civilian
support and underground liaison, underground supply methods, and possible
collusion between local government officials and the underground. Before
such a unit can be properly trained and disguised, however, much information
about the appearance, mannerisms, and security procedures of enemy units
must be gathered. Most of this information comes from defectors or
reindoctrinated prisoners. Defectors also make excellent instructors and
guides for an infiltrating unit. In using a disguised team, the selected men
should be trained, oriented, and disguised to look and act like authentic
underground or guerrilla units. In addition to acquiring valuable
information, the infiltrating units can demoralize the insurgents to the
extent that they become overly suspicious and distrustful of their own
units.
[...]
After establishing the cordon and designating a holding area, the
screening point or center is established. All civilians in the cordoned area
will then pass through the screening center to be classified.
National police personnel will complete, if census data does not exist
in the police files, a basic registration card and photograph all personnel
over the age of 15. They print two copies of each photo- one is pasted to
the registration card and the other to the village book (for possible use in
later operations and to identify ralliers and informants).
The screening element leader ensures the screeners question relatives,
friends, neighbors, and other knowledgeable individuals of guerrilla leaders
or functionaries operating in the area on their whereabouts, activities,
movements, and expected return.
The screening area must include areas where police and military
intelligence personnel can privately interview selected individuals. The
interrogators try to convince the interviewees that their cooperation will
not be detected by the other inhabitants. They also discuss, during the
interview, the availability of monetary rewards for certain types of
information and equipment.
[...]
Civilian Self-Defense Forces [Paramilitaries, or, especially in an
El-Salvador or Colombian civil war context, right wing "death squads"]
When a village accepts the CSDF program, the insurgents cannot choose
to ignore it. To let the village go unpunished will encourage other villages
to accept the government's CSDF program. The insurgents have no choice; they
have to attack the CSDF village to provide a lesson to other villages
considering CSDF. In a sense, the psychological effectiveness of the CSDF
concept starts by reversing the insurgent strategy of making the government
the repressor. It forces the insurgents to cross a critical threshold-that
of attacking and killing the very class of people they are supposed to be
liberating.
To be successful, the CSDF program must have popular support from
those directly involved or affected by it. The average peasant is not
normally willing to fight to his death for his national government. His
national government may have been a succession of corrupt dictators and
inefficient bureaucrats. These governments are not the types of institutions
that inspire fight-to-the- death emotions in the peasant. The village or
town, however, is a different matter. The average peasant will fight much
harder for his home and for his village than he ever would for his national
government. The CSDF concept directly involves the peasant in the war and
makes it a fight for the family and village instead of a fight for some
faraway irrelevant government.
[...]
Members of the CSDF receive no pay for their civil duties. In most
instances, however, they derive certain benefits from voluntary service.
These benefits can range from priority of hire for CMO projects to a place
at the head of ration lines. In El Salvador, CSDF personnel (they were
called civil defense there) were given a U.S.-funded life insurance policy
with the wife or next of kin as the beneficiary.If a CSDF member died in the
line of duty, the widow or next of kin was ceremoniously paid by an HN
official. The HN administered the program and a U.S. advisor who maintained
accountability of the funds verified the payment. The HN [Host Nation]
exercises administrative and visible control.
Responsiveness and speedy payment are essential in this process since
the widow normally does not have a means of support and the psychological
effect of the government assisting her in her time of grief impacts on the
entire community. These and other benefits offered by or through the HN
government are valuable incentives for recruiting and sustaining the CSDF.
[...]
The local CSDF members select their leaders and deputy leaders (CSDF
groups and teams) in elections organized by the local authorities. In some
cases, the HN [Host Nation] appoints a leader who is a specially selected
member of the HN security forces trained to carry out this task. Such
appointments occurred in El Salvador where the armed forces have established
a formal school to train CSDF commanders. Extreme care and close supervision
are required to avoid abuses by CSDF leaders.
[...]
The organization of a CSDF can be similar to that of a combat group.
This organization is effective in both rural and urban settings. For
example, a basic group, having a strength of 107 members, is broken down
into three 35-man elements plus a headquarters element of 2 personnel. Each
35-man element is further broken down into three 1 l-man teams and a
headquarters element of 2 personnel. Each team consists of a team leader, an
assistant team leader, and three 3-man cells. This organization can be
modified to accommodate the number of citizens available to serve.
[...]
Weapons training for the CSDF personnel is critical. Skill at arms
decides the outcome of battle and must be stressed. Of equal importance is
the maintenance and care of weapons. CSDF members are taught basic rifle
marksmanship with special emphasis on firing from fixed positions and during
conditions of limited visibility. Also included in the marksmanship training
program are target detection and fire discipline.
Training ammunition is usually allocated to the CSDF on the basis of a
specified number of rounds for each authorized weapon. A supporting HN
government force or an established CSDF logistic source provides the
ammunition to support refresher training.
[...]
Acts of misconduct by HN [Host Nation] personnel
All members of training assistance teams must understand their
responsibilities concerning acts of misconduct by HN personnel. Team members
receive briefings before deployment on what to do if they encounter or
observe such acts. Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions lists
prohibited acts by parties to the convention. Such acts are-
a.. Violence to life and person, in particular, murder, mutilation,
cruel treatment, and torture.
b.. Taking of hostages.
c.. Outrages against personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment.
d.. Passing out sentences and carrying out executions without
previous judgment by a regularly constituted court that affords all the
official guarantees that are recog-nized as indispensable by civilized
people.
e.. The provisions in the above paragraph represent a level of
conduct that the United States expects each foreign country to observe.
If team members encounter prohibited acts they can not stop, they will
disengage from the activity, leave the area if possible, and report the
incidents immediately to the proper in-country U.S. authorities. The country
team will identify proper U.S. authorities during the team's initial
briefing. Team members will not discuss such matters with non-U.S.
Government authorities such as journalists and civilian contractors.
[...]
Most insurgents' doctrinal and training documents stress the use of
pressure-type mines in the more isolated or less populated areas. They
prefer using commandtype mines in densely populated areas. These documents
stress that when using noncommand-detonate d mines, the insurgents use every
means to inform the local populace on their location, commensurate with
security regulations. In reality, most insurgent groups suffer from various
degrees of deficiency in their C2 [Command & Control] systems. Their C2 does
not permit them to verify that those elements at the operational level
strictly follow directives and orders. In the case of the Frente Farabundo
Marti de la Liberation Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador, the individual that
emplaces the mine is responsible for its recovery after the engagement.
There are problems with this concept. The individual may be killed or the
security forces may gain control of the area. Therefore, the recovery of the
mine is next to impossible.
[...]
Homemade antipersonnel mines are used extensively in El Salvador,
Guatemala and Malaysia. (Eighty percent of all El Salvadoran armed forces
casualties in 1986 were due to mines; in 1987, soldiers wounded by mines and
booby traps averaged 50 to 60 per month.) The important point to remember is
that any homemade mine is the product of the resources available to the
insurgent group. Therefore, no two antipersonnel mines may be the same in
their configuration and materials. Insurgent groups depend to a great extent
on materials discarded or lost by security forces personnel. The insurgents
not only use weapons, ammunition, mines, grenades, and demolitions for their
original purpose but also in preparing expedient mines and booby traps.
[...]
A series of successful minings carried out by the Viet Cong insurgents
on the Cua Viet River, Quang Tri Province, demonstrated their
resourcefulness in countering minesweeping tactics. Initially,
chain-dragging sweeps took place morning and evening. After several
successful mining attacks, it was apparent that they laid the mines after
the minesweepers passed. Then, the boats using the river formed into convoys
and transited the river with minesweepers 914 meters ahead oft he convoy.
Nevertheless, boats of the convoy were successfully mined in mid-channel,
indicating that the mines were again laid after the minesweeper had passed,
possibly by using sampans. Several sampans were observed crossing or
otherwise using the channel between the minesweepers and the convoy. The
convoys were then organized so that the minesweepers worked immediately
ahead of the convoy. One convoy successfully passed. The next convoy had its
minesweepers mined and ambushed close to the river banks.
[...]
Military Advisors
[...]
Psychologically pressuring the HN [Host Nation] counterpart may
sometimes be successful.Forms of psychological pressure may range from the
obvious to the subtle. The advisor never applies direct threats, pressure,
or intimidation on his counterpart Indirect psychological pressure may be
applied by taking an issue up the chain of command to a higher U.S.
commander. The U.S. commander can then bring his counterpart to force the
subordinate counterpart to comply. Psychological pressure may obtain quick
results but may have very negative side effects. The counterpart will feel
alienated and possibly hostile if the advisor uses such techniques. Offers
of payment in the form of valuables may cause him to become resentful of the
obvious control being exerted over him. In short, psychologically pressuring
a counterpart is not recommended. Such pressure is used only as a last
resort since it may irreparably damage the relationship between the advisor
and his counterpart
PSYOP [Psychological Operations] Support for Military Advisors
The introduction of military advisors requires preparing the populace
with which the advisors are going to work. Before advisors enter a country,
the HN [Host Nation] government carefully explains their introduction and
clearly emphasizes the benefits of their presence to the citizens. It must
provide a credible justification to minimize the obvious propaganda benefits
the insurgents could derive from this action. The country's dissenting
elements label our actions, no matter how well-intended, an "imperialistic
intervention. "
Once advisors are committed, their activities should be exploited.
Their successful integration into the HN [Host Nation] society and their
respect for local customs and mores, as well as their involvement with CA
[Civil Affairs] projects, are constantly brought to light. In formulating a
realistic policy for the use of advisors, the commander must carefully gauge
the psychological climate of the HN [Host Nation] and the United States.
[...]
PRC [Population & Resources Control] Operations.
Advisors assist their counterparts in developing proper control plans
and training programs for PRC measures. They also help coordinate plans and
requests for materiel and submit recommendations to improve the overall
effectiveness of operations. They can be helpful in preparing to initiate
control.
a.. Select, organize, and train paramilitary and irregular forces.
b.. Develop PSYOP [Psychological Operations] activities to support
PRC operations.
c.. Coordinate activities through an area coordination center (if
established) .
d.. Establish and refine PRC operations.
e.. Intensify intelligence activities.
f.. Establish and refine coordination and communications with other
agencies.
References
1.. ↑ Newsweek.Special Forces May Train Assassins, Kidnappers
in Iraq by Michael Hirsh & John Barry, Jan. 14, 2005, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/ 6802629/site/ newsweek/ print/1/displaym ode/1098/
2.. ↑ US State Department, FOIA record, http://foia.
state.gov/ documents/ elsalvad/ 738d.PDF
http://wikileaks. org/wiki/ How_to_train_ death_squads_ and_quash_
revolutions_ from_San_ Salvador_ to_you
http://www.informat ionclearinghouse .info/article201 25.htm
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How to Train Death Squads and Quash Revolutions from San Salvador to
Iraq
From Wikileaks
How to covertly train paramilitaries, censor the press, ban unions,
employ terrorists, conduct warrantless searches, suspend habeas corpus,
conceal breaches of the Geneva Convention and make the population love it
JULIAN ASSANGE (investigative editor)
Monday June 15, 2008
Wikileaks has released a sensitive 219 page US military
counterinsurgency manual. The manual, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics
Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces (1994, 2004), may be critically
described as "what we learned about running death squads and propping up
corrupt government in Latin America and how to apply it to other places".
Its contents are both history defining for Latin America and, given the
continued role of US Special Forces in the suppression of insurgencies,
including in Iraq and Afghanistan, history making.
The leaked manual, which has been verified with military sources, is
the official US Special Forces doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense or FID.
FID operations are designed to prop up a "friendly" government facing
a popular revolution or guerilla insurgency. FID interventions are often
covert or quasi-covert due to the unpopular nature of the governments being
supported ("In formulating a realistic policy for the use of advisors, the
commander must carefully gauge the psychological climate of the HN [Host
Nation] and the United States.")
The manual directly advocates training paramilitaries, pervasive
surveillance, censorship, press control and restrictions on labor unions &
political parties. It directly advocates warrantless searches, detainment
without charge and (under varying circumstances) the suspension of habeas
corpus. It directly advocates employing terrorists or prosecuting
individuals for terrorism who are not terrorists, running false flag
operations and concealing human rights abuses from journalists. And it
repeatedly advocates the use of subterfuge and "psychological operations"
(propaganda) to make these and other "population & resource control"
measures more palatable.
The content has been particularly informed by the long United States
involvement in El Salvador.
In 2005 a number of credible media reports suggested the Pentagon was
intensely debating "the Salvador option" for Iraq.[1]. According to the New
York Times Magazine:
The template for Iraq today is not Vietnam, with which it has often
been compared, but El Salvador, where a right-wing government backed by the
United States fought a leftist insurgency in a 12-year war beginning in
1980. The cost was high ― more than 70,000 people were killed, most
of them civilians, in a country with a population of just six million. Most
of the killing and torturing was done by the army and the right-wing death
squads affiliated with it. According to an Amnesty International report in
2001, violations committed by the army and associated groups included
‘‘extrajudicial executions, other unlawful killings,
‘disappearances’ and torture. . . . Whole villages were
targeted by the armed forces and their inhabitants massacred.’’ As
part of President Reagan’s policy of supporting anti-Communist
forces, hundreds of millions of dollars in United States aid was funneled to
the Salvadoran Army, and a team of 55 Special Forces advisers, led for
several years by Jim Steele, trained front-line battalions that were accused
of significant human rights abuses.
The same article states James Steele and many other former Central
American Special Forces "military advisors" have now been appointed at a
high level to Iraq.
In 1993 a United Nations truth commission on El Salvador, which
examined 22,000 atrocities that occurred during the twelve-year civil war,
attributed 85 percent of the abuses to the US-backed El Salvador military
and its paramilitary death squads.
It is worth noting what the US Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert E.
White (now the president for the Center for International Policy) had to say
as early as 1980, in State Department documents obtained under the Freedom
of Information Act:
The major, immediate threat to the existence of this government is the
right-wing violence. In the city of San Salvador, the hired thugs of the
extreme right, some of them well-trained Cuban and Nicaraguan terrorists,
kill moderate left leaders and blow up government buildings. In the
countryside, elements of the security forces torture and kill the
campesinos, shoot up their houses and burn their crops. At least two hundred
refugees from the countryside arrive daily in the capital city. This
campaign of terror is radicalizing the rural areas just as surely as
Somoza's National Guard did in Nicaragua. Unfortunately, the command
structure of the army and the security forces either tolerates or encourages
this activity. These senior officers believe or pretend to believe that they
are eliminating the guerillas.[2]
Selected extracts follow. Note that the manual is 219 pages long and
contains substantial material throughout. These extracts should merely be
considered representative. Emphasis has been added for further selectivity.
The full manual can be found at US Special Forces counter-insurgency manual
FM 31-20-3.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government
agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 5 December 2003.
Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United
States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN:
AOJK-DTD-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure
of contents or reconstruction of the document.
[...]
Counterintelligence
[...]
Most of the counterintelligence measures used will be overt in nature
and aimed at protecting installations, units, and information and detecting
espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Examples of counterintelligence
measures to use are
a.. Background investigations and records checks of persons in
sensitive positions and persons whose loyalty may be questionable.
b.. Maintenance of files on organizations, locations, and
individuals of counterintelligence interest.
c.. Internal security inspections of installations and units.
d.. Control of civilian movement within government-controll ed
areas.
e.. Identification systems to minimize the chance of insurgents
gaining access to installations or moving freely.
f.. Unannounced searches and raids on suspected meeting places.
g.. Censorship.
[...]
PSYOP [Psychological Operations] are essential to the success of PRC
[Population & Resources Control]. For maximum effectiveness, a strong
psychological operations effort is directed toward the families of the
insurgents and their popular support base. The PSYOP aspect of the PRC
program tries to make the imposition of control more palatable to the people
by relating the necessity of controls to their safety and well-being. PSYOP
efforts also try to create a favorable national or local government image
and counter the effects of the insurgent propaganda effort.
Control Measures
SF [US Special Forces] can advise and assist HN [Host Nation] forces
in developing and implementing control measures. Among these measures are
the following:
a.. Security Forces. Police and other security forces use PRC
[Population & Resources Control] measures to deprive the insurgent of
support and to identify and locate members of his infrastructure.
Appropriate PSYOP [Psychological Operations] help make these measures more
acceptable to the population by explaining their need. The government
informs the population that the PRC measures may cause an inconvenience but
are necessary due to the actions of the insurgents.
b.. Restrictions. Rights on the legality of detention or
imprisonment of personnel (for example, habeas corpus) may be temporarily
suspended. This measure must be taken as a last resort, since it may provide
the insurgents with an effective propaganda theme. PRC [Population &
Resources Control] measures can also include curfews or blackouts, travel
restrictions, and restricted residential areas such as protected villages or
resettlement areas. Registration and pass systems and control of sensitive
items (resources control) and critical supplies such as weapons, food, and
fuel are other PRC measures. Checkpoints, searches, roadblocks;
surveillance, censorship, and press control; and restriction of activity
that applies to selected groups (labor unions, political groups and the
like) are further PRC measures.
[...]
Legal Considerations. All restrictions, controls, and DA measures must
be governed by the legality of these methods and their impact on the
populace. In countries where government authorities do not have wide
latitude in controlling the population, special or emergency legislation
must be enacted. This emergency legislation may include a form of martial
law permitting government forces to search without warrant, to detain
without bringing formal charges, and to execute other similar actions.
[...]
Psychological Operations
PSYOP can support the mission by discrediting the insurgent forces to
neutral groups, creating dissension among the insurgents themselves, and
supporting defector programs. Divisive programs create dissension,
disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within the insurgent
forces. Also important are national programs to win insurgents over to the
government side with offers of amnesty and rewards. Motives for surrendering
can range from personal rivalries and bitterness to disillusionment and
discouragement. Pressure from the security forces has persuasive power.
[...]
Intelligence personnel must consider the parameters within which a
revolutionary movement operates. Frequently, they establish a centralized
intelligence processing center to collect and coordinate the amount of
information required to make long-range intelligence estimates. Long-range
intelligence focuses on the stable factors existing in an insurgency. For
example, various demographic factors (ethnic, racial, social, economic,
religious, and political characteristics of the area in which the
underground movement takes places) are useful in identifying the members of
the underground. Information about the underground organization at national,
district, and local level is basic in FID [Foreign Internal Defense] and/or
IDAD operations. Collection of specific short-range intelligence about the
rapidly changing variables of a local situation is critical. Intelligence
personnel must gather information on members of the underground, their
movements, and their methods. Biographies and photos of suspected
underground members, detailed information on their homes, families,
education, work history, and associates are important features of
short-range intelligence.
Destroying its tactical units is not enough to defeat the enemy. The
insurgent's underground cells or infrastructure must be neutralized first
because the infrastructure is his main source of tactical intelligence and
political control. Eliminating the infrastructure within an area achieves
two goals: it ensures the government's control of the area, and it cuts off
the enemy's main source of intelligence. An intelligence and operations
command center (IOCC) is needed at district or province level. This
organization becomes the nerve center for operations against the insurgent
infrastructure. Information on insurgent infrastructure targets should come
from such sources as the national police and other established intelligence
nets and agents and individuals (informants) .
The highly specialized and sensitive nature of clandestine
intelligence collection demands specially selected and highly trained
agents. Information from clandestine sources is often highly sensitive and
requires tight control to protect the source. However, tactical information
upon which a combat response can be taken should be passed to the
appropriate tactical level.
The spotting, assessment, and recruitment of an agent is not a
haphazard process regardless of the type agent being sought. During the
assessment phase, the case officer determines the individual's degree of
intelligence, access to target, available or necessary cover, and
motivation. He initiates the recruitment and coding action only after he
determines the individual has the necessary attributes to fulfill the needs.
All agents are closely observed and those that are not reliable are
relieved. A few well-targeted, reliable agents are better and more
economical than a large number of poor ones.
A system is needed to evaluate the agents and the information they
submit. The maintenance of an agent master dossier (possibly at the SFOD B
level) can be useful in evaluating the agent on the value and quality of
information he has submitted. The dossier must contain a copy of the agent's
source data report and every intelligence report he submitted.
Security forces can induce individuals among the general populace to
become informants. Security forces use various motives (civic-mindedness,
patriotism, fear, punishment avoidance, gratitude, revenge or jealousy,
financial rewards) as persuasive arguments. They use the assurance of
protection from reprisal as a major inducement. Security forces must
maintain the informant's anonymity and must conceal the transfer of
information from the source to the security agent. The security agent and
the informant may prearrange signals to coincide with everyday behavior.
Surveillance, the covert observation of persons and places, is a
principal method of gaining and confirming intelligence information.
Surveillance techniques naturally vary with the requirements of different
situations. The basic procedures include mechanical observation (wiretaps or
concealed microphones) , observation from fixed locations, and physical
surveillance of subjects.
Whenever a suspect is apprehended during an operation, a hasty
interrogation takes place to gain immediate information that could be of
tactical value. The most frequently used methods for gathering information
(map studies and aerial observation) , however, are normally unsuccessful.
Most PWs cannot read a map. When they are taken on a visual reconnaissance
flight, it is usually their first flight and they cannot associate an aerial
view with what they saw on the ground.
The most successful interrogation method consists of a map study based
on terrain information received from the detainee. The interrogator first
asks the detainee what the sun's direction was when he left the base camp.
From this information, he can determine a general direction. The
interrogator then asks the detainee how long it took him to walk to the
point where he was captured. Judging the terrain and the detainee's health,
the interrogator can determine a general radius in which the base camp can
be found (he can use an overlay for this purpose). He then asks the detainee
to identify significant terrain features he saw on each day of his journey,
(rivers, open areas, hills, rice paddies, swamps). As the detainee speaks
and his memory is jogged, the interrogator finds these terrain features on a
current map and gradually plots the detainee's route to finally locate the
base camp.
If the interrogator is unable to speak the detainee's language, he
interrogates through an interpreter who received a briefing beforehand. A
recorder may also assist him. If the interrogator is not familiar with the
area, personnel who are familiar with the area brief him before the
interrogation and then join the interrogation team. The recorder allows the
interrogator a more free-flowing interrogation. The recorder also lets a
knowledgeable interpreter elaborate on points the detainee has mentioned
without the interrogator interrupting the continuity established during a
given sequence. The interpreter can also question certain inaccuracies,
keeping pressure on the subject. The interpreter and the interrogator have
to be well trained to work as a team. The interpreter has to be familiar
with the interrogation procedures. His preinterrogation briefings must
include information on the detainee's health, the circumstances resulting in
his detention, and the specific information required. A successful
interrogation is contingent upon continuity and a welltrained interpreter. A
tape recorder (or a recorder taking notes) enhances continuity by freeing
the interrogator from time-consuming administrative tasks.
[...]
Political Structures. A tightly disciplined party organization,
formally structured to parallel the existing government hierarchy, may be
found at the center of some insurgent movements. In most instances, this
organizational structure will consist of committed organizations at the
village, district province, and national levels. Within major divisions and
sections of an insurgent military headquarters, totally distinct but
parallel command channels exist. There are military chains of command and
political channels of control. The party ensures complete domination over
the military structure using its own parallel organization. It dominates
through a political division in an insurgent military headquarters, a party
cell or group in an insurgent military unit, or a political military
officer.
[...]
Special Intelligence- Gathering Operations
Alternative intelligence- gathering techniques and sources, such as
doppelganger or pseudo operations, can be tried and used when it is hard to
obtain information from the civilian populace. These pseudo units are
usually made up of ex-guerrilla and/or security force personnel posing as
insurgents. They circulate among the civilian populace and, in some cases,
infiltrate guerrilla units to gather information on guerrilla movements and
its support infrastructure.
Much time and effort must be used to persuade insurgents to switch
allegiance and serve with the security forces. Prospective candidates must
be properly screened and then given a choice of serving with the HN [Host
Nation] security forces or facing prosecution under HN law for terrorist
crimes.
Government security force units and teams of varying size have been
used in infiltration operations against underground and guerrilla forces.
They have been especially effective in getting information on underground
security and communications systems, the nature and extent of civilian
support and underground liaison, underground supply methods, and possible
collusion between local government officials and the underground. Before
such a unit can be properly trained and disguised, however, much information
about the appearance, mannerisms, and security procedures of enemy units
must be gathered. Most of this information comes from defectors or
reindoctrinated prisoners. Defectors also make excellent instructors and
guides for an infiltrating unit. In using a disguised team, the selected men
should be trained, oriented, and disguised to look and act like authentic
underground or guerrilla units. In addition to acquiring valuable
information, the infiltrating units can demoralize the insurgents to the
extent that they become overly suspicious and distrustful of their own
units.
[...]
After establishing the cordon and designating a holding area, the
screening point or center is established. All civilians in the cordoned area
will then pass through the screening center to be classified.
National police personnel will complete, if census data does not exist
in the police files, a basic registration card and photograph all personnel
over the age of 15. They print two copies of each photo- one is pasted to
the registration card and the other to the village book (for possible use in
later operations and to identify ralliers and informants).
The screening element leader ensures the screeners question relatives,
friends, neighbors, and other knowledgeable individuals of guerrilla leaders
or functionaries operating in the area on their whereabouts, activities,
movements, and expected return.
The screening area must include areas where police and military
intelligence personnel can privately interview selected individuals. The
interrogators try to convince the interviewees that their cooperation will
not be detected by the other inhabitants. They also discuss, during the
interview, the availability of monetary rewards for certain types of
information and equipment.
[...]
Civilian Self-Defense Forces [Paramilitaries, or, especially in an
El-Salvador or Colombian civil war context, right wing "death squads"]
When a village accepts the CSDF program, the insurgents cannot choose
to ignore it. To let the village go unpunished will encourage other villages
to accept the government's CSDF program. The insurgents have no choice; they
have to attack the CSDF village to provide a lesson to other villages
considering CSDF. In a sense, the psychological effectiveness of the CSDF
concept starts by reversing the insurgent strategy of making the government
the repressor. It forces the insurgents to cross a critical threshold-that
of attacking and killing the very class of people they are supposed to be
liberating.
To be successful, the CSDF program must have popular support from
those directly involved or affected by it. The average peasant is not
normally willing to fight to his death for his national government. His
national government may have been a succession of corrupt dictators and
inefficient bureaucrats. These governments are not the types of institutions
that inspire fight-to-the- death emotions in the peasant. The village or
town, however, is a different matter. The average peasant will fight much
harder for his home and for his village than he ever would for his national
government. The CSDF concept directly involves the peasant in the war and
makes it a fight for the family and village instead of a fight for some
faraway irrelevant government.
[...]
Members of the CSDF receive no pay for their civil duties. In most
instances, however, they derive certain benefits from voluntary service.
These benefits can range from priority of hire for CMO projects to a place
at the head of ration lines. In El Salvador, CSDF personnel (they were
called civil defense there) were given a U.S.-funded life insurance policy
with the wife or next of kin as the beneficiary.If a CSDF member died in the
line of duty, the widow or next of kin was ceremoniously paid by an HN
official. The HN administered the program and a U.S. advisor who maintained
accountability of the funds verified the payment. The HN [Host Nation]
exercises administrative and visible control.
Responsiveness and speedy payment are essential in this process since
the widow normally does not have a means of support and the psychological
effect of the government assisting her in her time of grief impacts on the
entire community. These and other benefits offered by or through the HN
government are valuable incentives for recruiting and sustaining the CSDF.
[...]
The local CSDF members select their leaders and deputy leaders (CSDF
groups and teams) in elections organized by the local authorities. In some
cases, the HN [Host Nation] appoints a leader who is a specially selected
member of the HN security forces trained to carry out this task. Such
appointments occurred in El Salvador where the armed forces have established
a formal school to train CSDF commanders. Extreme care and close supervision
are required to avoid abuses by CSDF leaders.
[...]
The organization of a CSDF can be similar to that of a combat group.
This organization is effective in both rural and urban settings. For
example, a basic group, having a strength of 107 members, is broken down
into three 35-man elements plus a headquarters element of 2 personnel. Each
35-man element is further broken down into three 1 l-man teams and a
headquarters element of 2 personnel. Each team consists of a team leader, an
assistant team leader, and three 3-man cells. This organization can be
modified to accommodate the number of citizens available to serve.
[...]
Weapons training for the CSDF personnel is critical. Skill at arms
decides the outcome of battle and must be stressed. Of equal importance is
the maintenance and care of weapons. CSDF members are taught basic rifle
marksmanship with special emphasis on firing from fixed positions and during
conditions of limited visibility. Also included in the marksmanship training
program are target detection and fire discipline.
Training ammunition is usually allocated to the CSDF on the basis of a
specified number of rounds for each authorized weapon. A supporting HN
government force or an established CSDF logistic source provides the
ammunition to support refresher training.
[...]
Acts of misconduct by HN [Host Nation] personnel
All members of training assistance teams must understand their
responsibilities concerning acts of misconduct by HN personnel. Team members
receive briefings before deployment on what to do if they encounter or
observe such acts. Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions lists
prohibited acts by parties to the convention. Such acts are-
a.. Violence to life and person, in particular, murder, mutilation,
cruel treatment, and torture.
b.. Taking of hostages.
c.. Outrages against personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment.
d.. Passing out sentences and carrying out executions without
previous judgment by a regularly constituted court that affords all the
official guarantees that are recog-nized as indispensable by civilized
people.
e.. The provisions in the above paragraph represent a level of
conduct that the United States expects each foreign country to observe.
If team members encounter prohibited acts they can not stop, they will
disengage from the activity, leave the area if possible, and report the
incidents immediately to the proper in-country U.S. authorities. The country
team will identify proper U.S. authorities during the team's initial
briefing. Team members will not discuss such matters with non-U.S.
Government authorities such as journalists and civilian contractors.
[...]
Most insurgents' doctrinal and training documents stress the use of
pressure-type mines in the more isolated or less populated areas. They
prefer using commandtype mines in densely populated areas. These documents
stress that when using noncommand-detonate d mines, the insurgents use every
means to inform the local populace on their location, commensurate with
security regulations. In reality, most insurgent groups suffer from various
degrees of deficiency in their C2 [Command & Control] systems. Their C2 does
not permit them to verify that those elements at the operational level
strictly follow directives and orders. In the case of the Frente Farabundo
Marti de la Liberation Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador, the individual that
emplaces the mine is responsible for its recovery after the engagement.
There are problems with this concept. The individual may be killed or the
security forces may gain control of the area. Therefore, the recovery of the
mine is next to impossible.
[...]
Homemade antipersonnel mines are used extensively in El Salvador,
Guatemala and Malaysia. (Eighty percent of all El Salvadoran armed forces
casualties in 1986 were due to mines; in 1987, soldiers wounded by mines and
booby traps averaged 50 to 60 per month.) The important point to remember is
that any homemade mine is the product of the resources available to the
insurgent group. Therefore, no two antipersonnel mines may be the same in
their configuration and materials. Insurgent groups depend to a great extent
on materials discarded or lost by security forces personnel. The insurgents
not only use weapons, ammunition, mines, grenades, and demolitions for their
original purpose but also in preparing expedient mines and booby traps.
[...]
A series of successful minings carried out by the Viet Cong insurgents
on the Cua Viet River, Quang Tri Province, demonstrated their
resourcefulness in countering minesweeping tactics. Initially,
chain-dragging sweeps took place morning and evening. After several
successful mining attacks, it was apparent that they laid the mines after
the minesweepers passed. Then, the boats using the river formed into convoys
and transited the river with minesweepers 914 meters ahead oft he convoy.
Nevertheless, boats of the convoy were successfully mined in mid-channel,
indicating that the mines were again laid after the minesweeper had passed,
possibly by using sampans. Several sampans were observed crossing or
otherwise using the channel between the minesweepers and the convoy. The
convoys were then organized so that the minesweepers worked immediately
ahead of the convoy. One convoy successfully passed. The next convoy had its
minesweepers mined and ambushed close to the river banks.
[...]
Military Advisors
[...]
Psychologically pressuring the HN [Host Nation] counterpart may
sometimes be successful.Forms of psychological pressure may range from the
obvious to the subtle. The advisor never applies direct threats, pressure,
or intimidation on his counterpart Indirect psychological pressure may be
applied by taking an issue up the chain of command to a higher U.S.
commander. The U.S. commander can then bring his counterpart to force the
subordinate counterpart to comply. Psychological pressure may obtain quick
results but may have very negative side effects. The counterpart will feel
alienated and possibly hostile if the advisor uses such techniques. Offers
of payment in the form of valuables may cause him to become resentful of the
obvious control being exerted over him. In short, psychologically pressuring
a counterpart is not recommended. Such pressure is used only as a last
resort since it may irreparably damage the relationship between the advisor
and his counterpart
PSYOP [Psychological Operations] Support for Military Advisors
The introduction of military advisors requires preparing the populace
with which the advisors are going to work. Before advisors enter a country,
the HN [Host Nation] government carefully explains their introduction and
clearly emphasizes the benefits of their presence to the citizens. It must
provide a credible justification to minimize the obvious propaganda benefits
the insurgents could derive from this action. The country's dissenting
elements label our actions, no matter how well-intended, an "imperialistic
intervention. "
Once advisors are committed, their activities should be exploited.
Their successful integration into the HN [Host Nation] society and their
respect for local customs and mores, as well as their involvement with CA
[Civil Affairs] projects, are constantly brought to light. In formulating a
realistic policy for the use of advisors, the commander must carefully gauge
the psychological climate of the HN [Host Nation] and the United States.
[...]
PRC [Population & Resources Control] Operations.
Advisors assist their counterparts in developing proper control plans
and training programs for PRC measures. They also help coordinate plans and
requests for materiel and submit recommendations to improve the overall
effectiveness of operations. They can be helpful in preparing to initiate
control.
a.. Select, organize, and train paramilitary and irregular forces.
b.. Develop PSYOP [Psychological Operations] activities to support
PRC operations.
c.. Coordinate activities through an area coordination center (if
established) .
d.. Establish and refine PRC operations.
e.. Intensify intelligence activities.
f.. Establish and refine coordination and communications with other
agencies.
References
1.. ↑ Newsweek.Special Forces May Train Assassins, Kidnappers
in Iraq by Michael Hirsh & John Barry, Jan. 14, 2005, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/ 6802629/site/ newsweek/ print/1/displaym ode/1098/
2.. ↑ US State Department, FOIA record, http://foia.
state.gov/ documents/ elsalvad/ 738d.PDF
http://wikileaks. org/wiki/ How_to_train_ death_squads_ and_quash_
revolutions_ from_San_ Salvador_ to_you
http://www.informat ionclearinghouse .info/article201 25.htm
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